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I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that alcohol related injuries and accidents are
prevalent in the United States. Alcohol consumption is associated
with a wide range of accidents and injuries resulting from the im-
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paired performance of complex mental and motor functions.'
Studies show that at least forty percent of all traffic fatalities are al-
2cohol related. Alcohol also increases the risk of accidental injuries
from other causes. In one study of emergency room patients who
were admitted by injuries, forty-seven percent tested positive for al-
cohol and thirty-five percent were intoxicated.' In addition to caus-
ing themselves injury, these intoxicated individuals often cause
harm to others.
To help deal with the high costs in life and money caused by
this epidemic, state legislatures across the United States have en-
acted Dram Shop laws. Dram Shop laws create a statutory cause of
action, on behalf of an injured third party, against the seller of the
alcohol that "caused" the accident.5 Minnesota has had a dram
shop statute on the books in some form since 1911.6
The "complicity doctrine," sometimes called the "innocent
party doctrine," is a judicially created defense to the statute that
denies certain parties standing to sue.7 The complicity doctrine
disallows a person to sue under the dram shop act if he had an ac-
tive role in producing the intoxication that harmed him.s For over
1. Enoch Gordis, Alcohol-Related Impairment-A Commentary, Alcohol Alert No.
25 PH 351 (Nat'l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism, Bethesda, MD) at
http://silk.nih.gov/silk/niaaal/publication/aa25.htm (July 1994).
2. T.S. Zobeck et al., Surveillance Report #26: Trends in Alcohol-Related Fa-
tal Traffic Crashes, United States: 1979-91; see also Rockville, MD: National Institute
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, Division of Biometry and Epidemiology, Nov.
1993. Traffic accidents are the leading cause of accidental deaths. Id. In addi-
tion, estimates of alcohol involvement in plane crashes range from ten percent to
thirty percent, and the Coast Guard reports possible alcohol involvement in sixty
percent of boating fatalities. J.G. Modell &J.M. Mountz, Drinking And Flying-The
Problem Of Alcohol Use By Pilots, N. Eng. J. of Med. 323 (7):455-461 (1990); Howland,
et al., Missing the Boat on Drinking and Boating, JAMA, 270 (1) :91-92 (1993).
3. Nidus Information Services, Inc., Well-Connected Report: Alcoholism.
December 1998, at http://www.wellconnected.com.
4. This occurred largely as a result of the temperance movement of the mid-
1800's. Daphne D. Sipes, The Emergence of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A
Comparative Study, 8 REv. LITIG. 1, 3-4 (1988).
5. Infra note 19 and accompanying text.
6. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (1998) (providing historical notes). Minnesota's
Dram Shop act is called the Civil Damages Act (CDA). The terms "dram shop act"
or "dram shop statute" and "Civil Damages Act" (CDA) will be used interchangea-
bly.
7. Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 442, 159 N.W.2d 903,
906 (1968) (holding that one who participated in the intoxication of another has
no standing to sue under MINN. STAT § 340.95). See also 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating
Liquors § 538 (1999).
8. 45 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 7 at § 538.
1376 [Vol. 27:2
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thirty years, Minnesota recognized the complicity doctrine as a
complete bar to an action under the CDA.9
In K.R. v. Sanford, the Minnesota Supreme Court was tasked
with interpreting an amendment to Minnesota's Comparative Fault
Act (CFA). 0 The amendment seemingly overruled a long line of
cases and made the complicity doctrine a fault to be compared, as
opposed to a complete bar to the action." The court held that
complicity is no longer a bar to a cause of action under Minnesota
law. The court's analysis weighed heavily on legislative intent.
Faced with overwhelming documentation of the legislative process
in amending the CFA, the court made the correct ruling on the• . 14
question of interpretation. However, the legislature seemed to
misconstrue the purpose behind the creation of the dram shop
acts, and, in doing so, created a situation which will serve only to
undermine judicial efficiency and pervert a fundamental principle
of law.
This case note will review the pertinent history of the Minne-
sota's Civil Damages Act, and its adoption and adherence to the
complicity doctrine. Next will be a brief overview of the Minnesota
Supreme Court case, K.R. v. Sanford. In section IV, this case note
will discuss the underlying legal theories and purposes behind the
creation of dram shop acts, and how these underlying principles
can only be realized by continued adherence to the complicity doc-
trine in Minnesota. Finally, Section V explores the impact of K.R/
v. Sanford on future cases by analyzing it, in part, as applied to the
facts presented in this case.
II. HISTORY
A. Minnesota's Dram Shop Act
Under common law, there existed no cause of action against a
9. Turk, 280 Minn. at 442, 159 N.W.2d at 906-07.
10. KR.v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. 2000).
11. Id.; Martinson v. Monticello Mun. Liquors, 297 Minn 48, 209 N.W.2d 902
(1973); Heveron v. Viii. of Belgrade, 288 Minn. 395, 181 N.W.2d 692 (1970); Turk,
280 Minn. at 438, 443, 159 N.W.2d at 903, 907.
12. K.R, 605 N.W.2d at 388.
13. Id. at 392. "[W]e conclude that the legislature intended to eliminate
complicity as a complete defense to actions brought under the CDA...." Id.
14. In its decision, the court discusses the Minnesota Injury Compensation
Commission's recommendation and specific language regarding the complicity
doctrine. K.R, 605 N.W.2d at 392. Infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
2000] 1.377
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vendor for an injury resulting from the illegal sale of liquor.15 In
cases where injury to a third person resulted from the intoxication
of another, courts held that drinking liquor, not selling it, was the
proximate cause of the injury. 16 In the mid-1800s, many states en-
acted dram shop statutes that generally imposed strict liability upon
a seller of liquor for injuries caused by an intoxicated customer.17
Wisconsin, Minnesota's neighbor to the east, was the first such
state, adopting its statute in 1849."
In 1911, Minnesota adopted the CDA and created a cause of
action against the seller of alcohol for injuries to third persons.19
Minnesota's CDA creates a cause of action for "[a] spouse, child,
parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person.,,2
B. Minnesota's Adaptation Of The Complicity Doctrine
In 1968, Minnesota's Supreme Court, in Turk v. Long Branch
Saloon, Inc., introduced the complicity doctrine as a defense to the
statute.21  Because the court found the language of the statute
15. Common law liability did not exist with respect to injuries occurring off
the vendor's premises. E.g., Cowman v. Hansen, 92 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Iowa 1958);
Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345, 346-47, 34 N.W. 22, 22 (1887); Demge v. Feier-
stein, 268 N.W. 210, 212 (Wis. 1936).
16. James R. Myers, Dramshop Liability: The Blurry Status of Drinking Companions,
34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1990).
17. Id. at 1156.
18. Id. Wisconsin's dram shop statute required tavern owners to post a bond
to pay the expenses of all prosecutions, civil or criminal, arising from the selling of
alcoholic beverages. Id.
19. MINN. STAT § 340A.801. In 1985, Minnesota's first Civil Damages Act was
repealed and replaced by a new Civil Damages Act, Minnesota Statute § 340A.801
(1986). See also Strand v. Vill. of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 419, 72 N.W.2d 609, 614
(1955) (stating that cause of action for damages caused by an intoxicated person
or by intoxication of any person against one who by illegally selling intoxicating
liquor caused the intoxication of such person existed only by virtue of Civil Dam-
ages Act, and there was no such cause of action at common law).
20. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1(1998). The entire relevant subdivision
reads as follows:
Subdivision 1. A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other per-
son injured in person.. .by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of
another person, has a right of action in the person's own name for all
damages sustained against a person who caused the intoxication of that
person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages.
Id.
21. Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 442, 159 N.W.2d 903,
906 (1968). Although the court in Turk did not call this defense by its common
name, the "complicity doctrine," they recognized it as such in Herrly v. Muzik, 17
years later. Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Minn. 1985). Although it was
1378 [Vol. 27:2
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somewhat unclear, it turned to the legislative intent for help in the
interpretation.2 2 The court concluded that the protection of the
public created by the statute was not intended by the legislature to
be extended to persons who participate in the illegal sale of liq-
uor.2 3 Accordingly, the court held that a person who is injured be-
cause of the intoxication of another is not afforded a right under
the CDA if he himself participated in the illegal procurement of
24the liquor.
Later, in 1973, the Martinson court linked the complicity doc-
25
trine specifically with the language of the CDA. There, the court
expanded its construction of legislative intent by explaining that
the purpose of the CDA is both penal and remedial in nature, and
26that barring recovery by a wrongdoer advances the dual purposes.
at this point that the Minnesota Supreme Court officially introduced the complic-
ity doctrine as a defense to the dram shop act, it was, at the time, "the conven-
tional judicial position." Myers, supra note 16, at 1158. Illinois first recognized the
complicity defense in 1890.
22. Turk, 280 Minn. at 440-41, 159 N.W.2d at 905. The term "other person"
was not defined and was sufficiently vague as to require a judicial interpretation.
Id. "The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature." MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1998).
23. Turk, 280 Minn. at 442, 159 N.W.2d at 906. When applying statutes, it is
common judicial practice to analyze (1) the particular type of harm the statute was
intended to protect the public from, and (2) the classes of persons the statute was
intended to protect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 286, 288 (1965).
24. Turk, 280 Minn. at 442, 159 N.W.2d at 906 (concluding that an "innocent
third party" is one who has had nothing to do with illegal furnishing of liquor to
intoxicated wrongdoer).
25. Martinson v. Monticello Mun. Liquors, 297 Minn. 48, 53, 209 N.W.2d 902,
905 (1973). The court explains that although there is no statutory language defin-
'ing the effect of "complicity," the court has limited the benefits of the CDA to in-
nocent third persons. A person who himself is a wrongdoer does not fall within
the class of those to whom the statute gives a cause of action. Therefore, the
Martinson court created a clear link between the concept of complicity and the
right to bring an action. Id.
26. Id. at 906. For more Minnesota cases forwarding this purpose behind the
dram shop act, e.g., Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665 (Minn.
1983) (holding that the purpose of the dram shop act was to suppress mischief of
social ills which resulted from intoxication by providing an incentive for liquor
vendors to do everything in their power to avoid making illegal sales and by com-
pensating members of public who were injured as the result of illegal sales);
Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures, 555 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (stating that the purposes of the civil damages act are to protect health,
safety and welfare of the public through careful regulation of liquor distribution,
to penalize dram shops for illegal sale of liquor, and to provide a remedy for inno-
cent third persons injured as a result of another's intoxication), affd, 565 N.W.2d
433. But see Sworski v. Colman, et al., 204 Minn. 474, 283 N.W. 778 (1939) (stating
that the dram shop act did not manifest a legislative intent to protect the benefici-
2000] 1379
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Collectively, the cases defined "other person" as expressed in the
statute, to mean that only "innocent third parties" have standing to
sue under the CDA. 7
C. The 1977 Amendment To The Civil Damages Act
In 1977, the Minnesota Legislature amended the CDA by pro-
viding that actions for damages based upon liability imposed by the
statute shall be governed by the Minnesota CFA.28 The Minnesota
Supreme Court did not have occasion to discuss the impact of the
amendment until 1985, in Herrly v. Muzik.29 The Herrly court again
deferred to the legislative intent in deciding whether the amend-
ment overruled their prior decisions and made the complicity doc-
trine a fault to be compared, rather than a complete bar to the ac-. 30
ton. Here, the court concluded that the legislature had not
intended to overrule cases such as Turk and Martinson." Had they
meant to do so, they would have used more specific language to
aries of the statute from their own failures or to impose a penal liability).
27. Infra note 28 and accompanying text; Turk, 280 Minn. at 440-443, 159
N.W.2d at 905-906; see also Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Minn. 1985)
(stating that the defendant is liable only if the plaintiff has standing to commence
an action under the CDA). For a definition of "innocent third party," supra, note
24 and accompanying text. In a more recent case decided after the amendment to
the CFA, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lefo v. Hoggsbreath gave a definition of
"other person." Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn.
1998). The court said that "the term 'other person' refers to any other person in-
jured by the intoxication of another who played no role in causing the intoxication."
Id. (emphasis added). The Committee argued that this definition should apply,
and therefore, bar plaintiff's claim. K.R. v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387, 393 (Minn.
2000). However, the court dismissed the definition as dicta, since the complicity
doctrine was not at issue, nor was it even mentioned, in Lefto. Id. The Minnesota
Supreme Court considers dicta anything that goes beyond the issues presented in
the instant case. State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (Minn.
1956) (defining dicta and the reasons for not giving weight of precedent).
28. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1998) (The Civil Damages Act); MINN. STAT. §
604.01(1979) (The Minnesota Comparative Fault Act). In 1977, Minnesota fol-
lowed a Comparative Negligence Statute. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976). One year
after the 1977 amendment to the CDA, Minnesota adopted comparative fault by
simply amending this statute. Act of Apr. 5, 1979 ch. 738, §§ 6-7, 1978 Minn. Laws
836, 389-40.
29. See generally Herrly, 374 N.W.2d 275 (becoming the first case since the
amendment to challenge the complicity doctrine in front of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court).
30. Id. at 278. In dicta, the court theorized that their previous rulings on this
issue could not have escaped legislative attention. Therefore, if the legislature had
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make that intent clear.3 2 Therefore, notwithstanding the 1977
amendment to the CDA, comlicity continued to be a complete bar
to recovery under the statute.
D. The 1990 Amendment To The Comparative Fault Act
In 1990, the Minnesota Legislature amended the CFA.3 Upon
recommendation by a commission, the legislature added the de-
fense of complicity to the list of faults to be compared 5 Not until
KR v. Sanford has a Minnesota appellate court had the opportunity
to consider the effect of the 1990 amendment on the issue of
whether a complicit party can sue under the CDA.36
III. Kt v. SANFORD
A. The Facts
KR. was an employee at a downtown Minneapolis nightclub
known as First Avenue. On December 21, 1996, at around mid-
night, Sergio Vargas ("Vargas"), an acquaintance, asked KR. to buy
a bottle of vodka for him. Vargas gave KR. twenty dollars for the
32. Id. In Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, the Minnesota Supreme Court
speaks eloquently about the cause and effect relationship between judicial inter-
pretation and legislative amendment.
The import of this long history of legislative action/court interpretation
"duet" is this: liability for injuries caused by illegal sale of liquor was un-
known to the common law and is a part of our jurisprudence solely as a
creature of the legislature. Where the legislature has perceived this
court's holdings to have strayed from its intent, it has reacted by amend-
ing the Act accordingly.
Id. at 111-112.
33. Herrly, 374 N.W.2d at 276.
34. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1998) (providing historical notes). See
also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
35. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (2000). In its present state, the act
reads: "'Fault' includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others....The term also in-
cludes... the defense of complicity under section 340A.801." Id. "Section
340A.801" refers specifically to the Civil Damages Act. Id.
36. K.R. v. Sanford, 588 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), cert. granted,
No. C2-98-1377 (Minn. 2000). In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1998). Although the
main crux of the case was to examine the meaning of "other person" under the
CDA, the case did not specifically deal with the amendment, or the complicity
doctrine. Id.
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purchase and promised to drive KR. home from work. 9
When her shift was over, KR. illegally purchased the bottle of40
vodka for Vargas from her manager. At about 5:00 a.m., Vargas
arrived at the club to collect his vodka and drive K-R. home.41 Var-
gas arrived with two friends, Brandon Sanford ("Sanford") and
Douglas Schneider ("Schneider") .
After stopping at a party, the four went to Sanford's apartment
to have a drink.43 Vargas, Schneider and KR. each mixed a drink
using the vodka KR. had illegally purchased for Vargas earlier.44
Vargas and KR. each inhaled a line of cocaine. 4 Both Vargas and
46Schneider continued to drink. Because Vargas was too intoxi-
cated to drive, they decided to sleep at the apartment.47 Vargas gave
K.R. a drug called a "ruffle" to help her sleep.48 After taking the
pill, K.R. started to go in and out of lucid consciousness. 49 When
KtR. regained consciousness, she found three men sexually assault-
ing her.
B. Procedural History And The Court's Analysis
K.R. brought suit in district court against The Committee un-
der Minnesota's CDA.51 The district court granted The Commit-
tee's motion for summary judgment, ruling that K.R. did not have
standing as an "other person" under the CDA because of her com-
plicity. The court of appeals reversed the district court conclud-
ing that the 1990 amendment to the CFA made complicity an issue
to be considered under comparative fault, and not a complete bar
39. Id.
40. Id. This was a common practice at First Avenue. Id. This practice of sell-
ing closed bottles of alcohol after hours and for off-premises consumption violated
Minnesota Statute section 340A.504, subd. 4(4). By violating the state statute, this
act qualifies as an "illegal selling [of] alcoholic beverages," as defined in the CDA.
MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (1998). Myers, supra note 16 and accompanying text.





46. Id. The two men each mixed and consumed at least two more drinks. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. "Ruffle" is the street name for the drug Rohypnol. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 389. Named Defendant "The Committee" owns and operates the
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to the action.53 Since this was the first time a Minnesota court had
an opportunity to consider the effect of the 1990 amendment, the
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.
54
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
holding that under the 1990 amendment to the CFA, complicity is
now a comparative fault and not a bar to the suit.5 5 In ruling on
this issue, the court returned once again to its scrutiny of the legis-
lative intent.56
The 1990 amendment was adopted by the legislature upon
recommendation by the Minnesota Injury Compensation Study
Commission. 57 The Commission recommended that "fault," with
regard to Minnesota's CFA, be redefined and should include theS. 58
defense of complicity. Specifically, it recommended that the de-
fense of complicity in actions brought under the CDA should be
subject to aportionment, and should no longer be a complete bar
to recovery./ The Minnesota Supreme Court, faced with the obvi-
ous intent of the legislature to overrule their previous decisions
with respect to the complicity doctrine, concluded that the com-
plicity doctrine is no longer a bar to recovery and K.R. has standing
to pursue a claim under the CFA.6°
53. K-R. v. Sanford, 588 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), cert.
granted, No. C2-98-1377 (Minn. 2000).
54. See generally K., 605 N.W.2d at 387 (discussing the amendment to the
CFA and its implications as applied to this case). In 1991, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals decided ONeil v. Pofah, Nos. C5-91-40, C4-91-45, C8-91-405 and C8-91-
467, 1991 WL 144832, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1991). The court affirmed the
complicity doctrine and concluded that it "applies to any person who is not an in-
nocent third party, regardless of that person's age." Id. at *2. The court does not
discuss the 1990 amendment to the CFA at all, and review was denied on October
11, 1991. Id. However, it is important to note that the events surrounding this
cause of action occurred in April 1998. Id.
55. K.R, 605 N.W.2d at 389.
56. Id. at 392.
57. Id. The recommendations were part of a massive tort reform recom-
mended by the Commission. The Minnesota Injury Compensation Study Commis-
sion was established by the legislature in 1988 to evaluate the tort recovery system
and make recommendations for changes. Michael K. Steenson, With the Legisla-
ture's Permission and the Supreme Court's Consent, Common Law Social Host Liability Re-
turns to Minnesota, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 45, 46 (1995); see also Minnesota In-
jury Compensation Study Comm'n, Report to the Legislature of 1990 (1990)
(hereinafter "Commission Report").
58. Commission Report supra note 57, at 5.
59. Id. In its report, the Commission specifically identified the complicity
doctrine and explained why it thought the doctrine should not act as a complete
bar to recovery. Id. at 33-34; See also K.L, 605 N.W.2d at 392.
60. KR., 605 N.W.2d at 394.
9
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IV. ANALYSIS
The tragedy in this case is not that the Minnesota Supreme
Court misconstrued the legislative intent. Indeed, it did not.6' The
tragedy is that the Minnesota Legislature's actions perverted the
original intent behind enacting dram shop laws, and Minnesota's
CDA.62
A. The Purpose Of Dram Shop Acts
Dram Shop acts were created to give an innocent third party a
cause of action against the illegal supplier of liquor, in the event
. . 63
that illegal act caused him injury. They were designed to place
the economic consequences of intoxicated behavior primarily on
the businesses that profited from the selling of liquor. As one
court pointed out, dram shop statutes are designed to fulfill a need
for discipline in the traffic of liquor and to provide a remedy for
evils and dangers which flow from such traffic. The evil and danger
we are concerned with here is that a person in an intoxicated con-
dition might unintentionally, but as a result of his intoxication, in-
65jure some other party.
Besides providing a remedy for injured persons, this type of
legislation was enacted to "protect the public, and the rights and
interests of innocent persons who come within their scope and to.. ,,66
discipline or restrain those who engage in the traffic of liquor.
Although protecting the public from the "evils" of liquor is an
underlying goal of dram shop statutes, it is also a general principle• 67
of law that one should not profit from his own wrongdoing. Ac-
61. MINN. STAT. § 645.116 (2000) ("When the words of a law in their applica-
tion to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the
law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.") Id.
62. Ubel v. State, 547 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn. 1996). "One legislature is not
the interpreter of laws enacted by prior legislature." Id. (Per Coyne, J., with one
judge concurring and two judges concurring in the result.)
63. Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
64. Walter v. Carriage House Hotels, Ltd., 646 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ill. 1995).
65. Martin v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985).
66. Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Iowa 1989); see also 48A CJ.S.
Intoxicating Liquors § 429 (1963).
67. Walter, 646 N.E.2d at 603-04. In a related legal theory which applies spe-
cifically to the case at hand, when a plaintiff's injury is a direct result of his know-
ing and intentional participation in an illegal act, he cannot seek compensation
for the loss, "if the criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to warrant a
denial of recovery." Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 41 (N.Y. 1984); see also Orzel
v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 212 (1995) (holding that where both plaintiff
[Vol. 27:21384
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cordingly, intoxicated persons themselves are denied recovery un-
der the dram shop statutes.
68
B. The Complicity Doctrine
"Protection of the innocent is central to [the] dram shop stat-
ute."69 Therefore, the courts sought to carry out that purpose when
they created the complicity doctrine.
Adhering to the complicity doctrine as a complete bar to an
action might sound to some like reinstating common law contribu-
tory negligence. Although there is a certain relationship between
71
the two, they are different. Contributory negligence is "conduct
on the part of plaintiff contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. 7 ' As one Illinois court put it,
"[c] ontributory negligence relates to the plaintiff's role in causing
his own injury, while complicity concerns the plaintiff's role in
causing the inebriate's intoxication."73
Traditionally, garden-variety contributory negligence was not a
defense to a dram shop act.4 Even in Minnesota, the Minnesota
and defendant have participated in the illegal activity which is the basis for the
plaintiff's action, the plaintiffs claim is barred entirely). In Orzel, this doctrine was
used to bar a plaintiff's claim against a pharmacy where the plaintiff had obtained
prescription drugs without a valid prescription. Id. Notwithstanding the presence
of the dram shop act in the present case, the factual situations are similar. Here,
K.R. knowingly participated with the defendant in the illegal selling-purchase of
the vodka.
68. Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 356. This is also indicated by the statutory construc-
tion of most dram shop acts.
69. Id. at 351.
70. Grady v. Cedar Side Inn, Inc., 997 P.2d 197, 199 (Or. 2000).
71. Baxter v. Noce, 752 P.2d 240, 245 (N.M. 1998) (Stowers,J., dissenting).
72. W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER& KEETON ON THE LAwOFTORTS § 65 (5th
ed. 1984).
73. Walter v. Carriage House Hotels, Ltd., 646 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ill. 1995); see
also Baxter, 752 P.2d at 245 (providing definitions of both contributory negligence
and complicity in the dissent).
74. See generally Zucker v. Vogt, 329 F.2d. 426 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that con-
tributory negligence of a taxi driver changing his tire in the road was not a defense
to the dram shop act because the gravamen of a dram shop actions is not negli-
gence, but a statutory violation); Overocker v. Retoff, 234 N.E.2d 820 (I1. App. Ct.
1968) (finding that plaintiff's contributory negligence in attempting to break up a
bar fight was not a factor, since the remedy under the dram shop act is statutory,
and is not based in negligence); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa
1972) (holding that plaintiff's contributory negligence in vehicle crash no defense
when driver of other vehicle intoxicated by liquor given to him by defendant).
11
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Supreme Court recognized that contributory negligence would not
bar recovery.75 However, courts viewed complicity differently.
76
Being complicit is to be more than just negligent. It isn't the
same as, for example, being on a highway when struck by a drunk• 77
driver. Complicity, to the extent that will create an absolute bar
to recovery in an action under a dram shop act, exists only where
the injured party has encouraged or voluntarily participated, to a
material and substantial extent, in the drinking of alcoholic beverages
by the intoxicated person who caused the injuries.7 s
A favorite scenario of opponents of the complicity doctrine is
the situation in which friends are out together and take turns buy-
ing rounds of drinks.79 They subsequently might leave together
and the driver, because of his intoxication, crashes the vehicle in-
juring both himself, and his passenger.8' The argument is that, un-
der the complicity doctrine, the passenger will not be able to re-
cover under the dram shop act because he purchased some of the
75. Kvanli v. Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275 (1965) (holding that
although there was nothing in the record to support a finding that negligence on
the part of the plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident, concurring negligence,
if any, would not bar recovery).
76. Martin v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486, 489-90 (Iowa 1985). In a dram
shop action brought on behalf of an automobile passenger killed in a one-car col-
lision, contributory negligence was not a defense, although both assumption of
the risk and complicity were defenses. Id.
77. Wanna v. Miller, 136 N.W.2d 563, 571 (N.D. 1965). In Wanna, the plain-
tiff was standing at the rear of his automobile, trying to jack up the left rear wheel
so that the tire could be changed. Id. He was struck by a vehicle driven by an in-
toxicated person and suffered severe injuries. Id. The plaintiff was allowed to re-
cover money damages from the defendant tavern owner. Id.; see also Sanders v. Of-
ficers' Club of Conn., Inc., 397 A.2d 122, 123 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding
that plaintiff's deceased in preparing to tow disabled vehicle on highway was not
defense to action against bar serving liquor to defendant driver prior to fatal acci-
dent).
78. 45 AM. JUR. 2d supra note 7, at § 538. This is quite similar to language
used in Minnesota. Heveron v. Vill. of Belgrade, 181 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.
1970) (stating that recovery was barred only to those who "voluntarily" participated
to a material and substantial extent in the drinking which led to the intoxication).
Other jurisdictions seem to agree. E.g., Martin, 373 N.W.2d at 490 (recognizing
that 'participation' is a relative term and, in order to amount to complicity, it
should be more than passive); Parsons v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 6372, 408
N.E.2d 68, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that complicity existed where the plain-
tiff voluntarily participated to a material an substantial extent in the drinking
which led to the intoxication); Dahn v. Sheets, 305 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) (stating that participation was not shown to be sufficiently active by
evidence only tending to show that "plaintiff drank with" intoxicated driver).
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alcohol that caused the intoxication. If this were the case, it
might seem unfair to be barred recovery.
Fortunately, the complicity doctrine does not reach this far.
While it is true that there have been disagreements in the courts
regarding exactly what constitutes complicity and what does not,82
the most well-reasoned law indicates that it must be more than buy-
ing rounds of drinks s.8 "A court should not place too much weight
on any particular aspect of a plaintiffs conduct, such as buying an
inebriate 'rounds' of drinks, for purposes of determining whether
the affirmative defense of complicity applies."
4
"In order for participation to constitute complicity, it must be
more than passive, and it is not enough to establish complicity that
the individual is a mere drinking companion of the intoxicated
person."s5 There is a high threshold to overcome in order to be
81. Id. "We think it would be an absurd result if alcoholic beverage dealers
could avoid liability for illegal sales to intoxicated customer depending upon
whether the customers paid for their own drinks or took turn paying for each oth-
ers' drinks." Id. at 156.
82. Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 443, 159 N.W.2d 903,
904 (1968) (stating that one who knowingly and actively participates in events
leading to the intoxication of a minor has no right of action under the dram shop
statute); see also Martinson v Monticello Municipal Liquors, 297 Minn. 48, 55, 209
N.W.2d 902, 906 (1973) (holding the complicity defense applicable where plaintiff
and intoxicated person, both adults, took turns buying rounds of drinks, and
where plaintiff knew drinking partner was intoxicated; court found that he was in
as good a position as bartender to stop buying companion drinks, and therefore,
afforded no remedy under the statute); Hempstead v. Minneapolis Sheraton
Corp., 283 Minn. 1, 9, 166 N.W.2d 95, 99 (1969) (stating there is no complicity as
to bar recovery as long as the plaintiff has not procured or in other ways furnished
liquor to intoxicant, but is simply a companion).
83. 45 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 7, at § 538.
84. Id. For example, in an action against an bar owner and an intoxicated
patron for injuries sustained when the patron attacked plaintiff, plaintiff's actions
did not rise to level of active contribution to, or procurement of, patron intoxica-
tion. Walter v. Carriage House Hotels, Ltd. 607 N.E.2d 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In
this case, plaintiff bought patron one drink at dinner and accepted three or four
beers from patron, but did notjoin patron in his consumption of 10 to 11 rounds
of beer and whisky. Id. at 663-64. In addition, plaintiff did not serve any drinks to
patron or encourage him to drink. Id. at 664.
85. 45 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 7, at § 538. In some situations, buying rounds
might constitute complicity. For example, in Turk the plaintiff, an adult, had
been drinking with several companions, including one he knew to be a minor.
Turk, 280 Minn. at 440, 159 N.W.2d at 905. Each paid for at least one round of
drinks, but the court found that the plaintiff bought more than his share of
rounds. Id. After six hours of drinking, the minor while driving, collided with a
parked car, resulting in the plaintiffs injuries. Id. The court found that a person
who buys drinks for an obviously intoxicated person, or one whom he knows to be
a minor, is at least as much the cause of the resulting intoxication as the bartender
13
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judged complicit, and courts must determine a plaintiffs complic-
ity on a case by case basis.8 6
C. The Purpose Behind Dram Shop Acts Is Married With The Complicity
Doctrine
In essence, the rationale supporting the adherence to the com-
plicity doctrine coexists with the rationale in creating dram shop
acts in the first place." The goal of a dram shop act is to protect
innocent parties, not those who have participated in an intoxicated
88person's intoxication.
Under the dram shop acts, an intoxicated person who injures
himself cannot recover any damages from the liquor serving estab-
lishment, even though the establishment might be partially respon-
89sible for his injuries. In light of this principle, it is contrary to
who served the customer illegally. Id.
86. Nelson v. Araiza, 372 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1977) (observing that whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the complicity doctrine will be for judicial
determination, but in many cases, application of the doctrine will be an issue of
fact under the given circumstances); Walter, 646 N.E.2d at 608 (refraining to assign
general factors to be used in analysis of existence of complicity because "the exis-
tence of complicity will depend on the specific facts of each case").
87. This is the same rationale that still supports courts' decisions not to allow
one who is voluntarily intoxicated to recover under the CDA. E.g., Kryzer v.
Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1992) (holding that an in-
jury to the wrist of a patron who was forcibly removed from a bar by an employee
was not entitled to sue under the CDA on a theory that the bar served her after she
was obviously intoxicated); Hanna v. Jensen, 298 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1980)
(holding that although dram shop act imposed liability on the part of the bar
owner, it did not protect intoxicated persons injured as a result of their own in-
toxication); Johnson v. St. Charles Mun. Liquor Store, 392 N.W.2d 909, 911
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the city, as proprietor of a liquor store, was
not liable to an intoxicated person for alleged negligence of bartender in serving
obviously intoxicated person after patron tripped, fell, and was injured).
88. Cox v. Rolling Acres Golf Course Corp., 532 N.W.2d 761, 763-764 (Iowa
1995).
89. Craig v. Larson, 439 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Mich. 1989).
In striking the balance between the rights of persons injured under dramshop-
related facts and the extent of the tavern owner's liability, the Legislature chose to
omit intoxicated persons as a class protected by the act .... [W]e believe the Legisla-
ture's failure to include the intoxicated party within the class of persons protected
is indicative of its belief that the intoxicated party should not be afforded a rem-
edy. To construe the statute otherwise would do violence to the Legislature's in-
tent and its continuing efforts to keep the act internally balanced.
Id. (quotingJackson v. PKM Corp., 422 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Mich. 1998)). Here, the
Supreme Court of Michigan interpreted that state's dram shop act which reads
substantially the same as Minnesota's Civil Damages Act: "A wife, husband, child,
parent, guardian, or other person injured in person, property, means of support,
1388 [Vol. 27:2
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conclude that partial recovery is available to a plaintiff who actively
participates in the intoxication of the person who thereafter injures
her.90
The very nature of the dram shop act lends credence to this in-
terpretation. As mentioned, there was no recognized liability un-
der common law for servers of alcohol, whose patrons, by virtue of
their intoxication, subsequently injured third parties. 91 The acts
were created to "fill the void left by the common law's general rule
of non-liability. ''92 They were intended to be "a complete and self-
contained solution to a problem not adequately addresses at com-
mon law, and the exclusive remedy for any action arising under
dramshop related facts."93
The complicity doctrine, as a defense to this statutory cause of
action, is garnered from the intent of the enacting legislature, and
is not dependent upon the common-law doctrine of contributory
negligence, nor, as here, comparative fault.94 The aim of the dram
shop statutes is not a matter of securing "fairness" for people who
drink.95 The "fairness" concept is defined in terms of proportional
fault.96 Dram shop acts, instead, choose a class of people who
otherwise...." Id.; 1933 (Ex. Sess.) Mich. Pub. Acts 8, amended by 1980 P.A. 351,
M.C.L. § 436.22 (5); see also M.S.A. § 18.993(5) for full version of Michigan's gov-
erning dram shop act.
90. Craig, 439 N.W.2d at 900. The Michigan Supreme Court in this case de-
clined to reevaluate this interpretation and exercise its authority to reshape the
common law by replacing the complicity doctrine with the principles of compara-
tive fault. Id.
91. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. Craig, 439 N.W.2d at 902 (citing Millross v. Plum Hollow Golf Club, 413
N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. 1987)).
94. Craig, 439 N.W.2d at 905. See also Nelson v. Araiza, 372 N.E.2d 637, 638-39
(I1l. 1978) (stating recovery by a plaintiff guilty of complicity in the inebriate's in-
toxication would undermine the purpose of the dram shop act, distinguishing
complicity from the common-law negligence concept of contributory negligence).
This is because, as stated, "[t]he liability created by the Civil Damages Act has no
relation to any common law liability, or any theory of tort. It was the intention of
the legislatures to create liability in a class of cases where there was no liability un-
der the common law." Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (N.D. 1957). Be-
cause liability is not imposed for negligent conduct, it makes no sense to base a
defense on the "negligent" conduct of the plaintiff. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438
N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D. 1989). Instead, the complicity doctrine is based on af-
firmative actions by the plaintiff, those which will remove him from the class of
"other person." Id.
95. Martin v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486, 488 (1985).
96. Id.
15
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should receive protection under the act.9' The intent was to pro-
tect "other persons"-innocent third parties. 
s
By studying their decisions in Turk and Herrly, it seems the
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation. In Her-
rly, when faced with the 1977 amendment, the court concluded
that the legislature did not intend to negate the complicity de-
fense.99 The court also concluded that if the complicity defense
were negated, the legislature would have created an anomaly by
barring a claim by a voluntary intoxicated person, yet permitting a
person who participated in that intoxication to recover. 00 In doing
so, the court echoed the intent of those creating the dram shop
acts in the first place, to deter sales of alcohol to certain classes of
person who are likely to injure innocent third persons, and to pro-
vide a cause of action if they do101
D. Minnesota's Comparative Fault Doctrine Now Includes Complicity As
A Comparative Fault
In 1978, the Minnesota legislature enacted the CFA, and
changed the common law role of contributory negligence.0 2 Nev-
ertheless, those actions which would traditionally constitute con-
tributory negligence are the same as those that are compared un-
der Minnesota's CDA. 103 Upon recommendation, the legislature
added complicity to that list.
1 4
The Commission's rationale for its recommendation suggests
that the complicity doctrine is similar to other forms of compara-
tive fault.105 However, what it failed to recognize was that the judi-
cially created complicity doctrine was an interpretation of the stat-
97. Id.
98. Craig, 439 N.W.2d at 902-03; Jackson v. PKM Corp., 422 N.W.2d 657, 660
(Mich. 1988); Iszler, 80 N.W.2d at 666.
99. Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 1985).
100. Steenson, supra note 57, at 83.
101. Myers, supra note 16, at 1154.
102. Supra note 28 and accompanying text. This is when Minnesota first de-
fined "fault." It is under this definition that complicity now falls.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 1985); Commission Report,
supra note 57, at 33-34 (claiming that complicity is difficult to distinguish from
other types of contributory negligence and, therefore, fits better into this group-
ing of defenses than as a complete bar).
1390 [Vol. 27:2
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ute itself, not technically a defense. '°6 The Turk court, introducing
the complicity doctrine, echoed traditional rationale when it con-
cluded that the protection afforded the statute was not meant to
extend to those who participate in the illegality of the sale or in-
toxication of the wrongdoer.
In explaining its decision, the court said that "to hold other-
wise would be to permit one who has been an intentional accessory
to the illegality to shift the loss resulting from it to a person no
more responsible for the damage than he himself had been. ' 18
The decision interpreted the term "other person" in the statute, to
discern who had standing to sue under the statute, and not an ac-
tual question of defense.
The Turk court distinguishes complicity from negligence, as if
anticipating that one day the two would be grouped together under
a definition of "fault."' Complicity is different from the situation
in which a party suffers loss at the hands of a person with whose in-
toxication he had no involvement.1 ° In such a case, Minnesota's
policy against supplying liquor illegally is so strong that recovery
will be allowed even though the injured person, in respects unre-
lated to the intoxication, may have failed to exercise reasonable
care for his own safety." Here, the court is clearly distinguishing
the complicity doctrine from such activities that would normally be
considered under the comparative fault statute."'
106. Turk v. Long Branch Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 442, 159 N.W.2d 903,
906 (1968); see also Note, Minnesota's Dramshop Act: Is the Complicity Doctrine Obso-
lete, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 705, 720 (1986) (explaining that complicity is a
statutory restrictions on the classes of plaintiffs who can maintain a dram shop ac-
tion, not a defense).
107. Turk, 280 Minn. at 442, 159 N.W.2d at 906. Illinois was the first state to
recognize the complicity doctrine in 1890. Hays v. Waite, 36 Ill. App. Ct. 397, 399
(1980). In this opinion, the court said that an injured party "must not be an active
and willing agent with the saloonkeeper, assisting in causing such intoxication."
Id. A few years later, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a wife who procured
liquor for her husband was barred from recovery after his subsequent death.
Rosencrants v. Shoemaker, 26 N.W. 794, 795 (Mich. 1886). From these judicial
beginnings, the complicity defense became a widely accepted doctrine until the
1980s. Myers, supra note 16, at 1157.
108. Turk, supra note 107.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text. This explanation ech-
oes the definition of "contributory negligence." Id.
112. Turk, 280 Minn. 442, 159 N.W.2d at 906. See generally MINN. STAT. §
604.01, subd. 1 (a) (1988) (listing the acts to be considered a fault for comparison
and apportionment.) The statute includes acts or omissions that are negligent or
17
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Adhering to traditional concepts, several other jurisdictions
which have comparative fault statutes treat complicity as a complete
bar, and do not include it as a comparative fault. There are some
jurisdictions, however, that disagree."
4
For instance, the Oregon Supreme Court was recently faced
with the decision whether or not to recognize the complicity doc-
trine in the first case to ask the question.' Oregon also operates
under a comparative fault system." 6 In Grady, the plaintiff was in-
jured when his drinking companion veered off the highway, struck
a power pole, and flipped over the car in which they were riding. " '
Since the plaintiff purchased most, if not all, of the alcohol
throughout the evening, the defendants argued that the complicity
doctrine should bar his recovery. 18 The Oregon Supreme Court
held that, under these circumstances, the complicity doctrine
would not be a bar.' 9
Oregon's situation, however, is quite different from Minne-
sota's. One part of Oregon's Dram Shop Act provides a remedy
when the bartender, or social host, serves or otherwise provides al-
reckless, the type of negligence associated with defenses under a common law
cause of action. Id.
113. E.g., Cookinham v. Sullivan, 179 A.2d 840 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963) (hold-
ing that the Dram Shop Act does not contemplate giving remedy to one who joins
and participates in violation of the Act); Lewis v. Champaign County VFW Post
5520, 543 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that victim of alleged assault by
intoxicated patron of two taverns could not recover in dramshop action when she
was "guilty of complicity" in his intoxication); Osinger v. Christian, 193 N.E.2d 572
(Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (holding that complicity is a defense to dram shop liability,
contributory negligence is not); Hill v. Alexander, 53 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct.
1944) (holding that complicity preclusion is not contributory negligence); Martin
v. Heddinger, 373 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1985) (holding that the Dramshop Act is
meant to protect only those who have not participated in the intoxication by their
complicity). Compare Baxter v. Noce, 752 P.2d 240 (N.M. 1998) (replacing com-
plicity defense with comparative negligence because the action under the statute
"sounds in negligence").
114. Mclsaac v. Monte Carlo Club, Inc. 587 So. 2d 320 (Ala. 1991) (reasoning
that objective of dram shop act would be defeated if liability shifted to patrons
drinking with intoxicated person); Aanen v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1989)
(holding party's complicity in drinking companions intoxication is no defense to
dram shop action); Grady v. Cedar Side Inn, Inc. 97 P.2d 197 (Or. 2000) (holding
in a case of first impression, that complicity is no defense to this limited fact pat-
tern).
115. Grady, 997 P.2d at 197-98.
116. OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1999) (abolishing contributory negligence stan-
dard and replacing it with comparative fault system).
117. Grady, 997 P.2d at 198.
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 198.
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• • ,,120cohol to patrons or guests who are obviously intoxicated. The
language of the statute creates liability for "damages incurred or
caused by intoxicated patrons or guests."' Within the original lan-
guage of the statute itself, the Oregon legislature meant for the in-
toxicated persons to have standing to sue under the statute in this
type of situation. Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court decided
against recognizing the complicity doctrine, but only in the context
of cases that involve providing alcohol to visibly intoxicated per-122
sons. The court did not expound on what the rule would be in
other situations.
2 3
Notwithstanding some jurisdictions' distinct analysis, most ju-
risdictions recognize the complicity doctrine and consider it a
120. Id. at 200. The Act provides:
No licen, permitted or social host is liable for damages incurred or
caused by intoxicated patrons or guests off the licen, permitted or social
host's premises unless:
The licen, permittee or social host has served or provided.. .alcoholic
beverages to the patron or guest while the patron or guest was visibly in-
toxicated; and
The plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the patron or
guest was served alcoholic beverages whole visibly intoxicated.
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1993)). The Oregon Legislature amended
section 30.950 in 1997. Those amendments apply only to claims arising on or after
March 15, 1998, and were not relevant to the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in
this case.) Grady, 997 P.2d at 200 n.1.
121. Grady, 997 P.2d at 200 (emphasis added). This is markedly different than
the language of Minnesota's Civil Damages Act. Supra note 18 and accompanying
text. States that have dram shop statutes that are similar to Minnesota include:
Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. § 123.92 (1971)), Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws § 436.22
(1961)), Illinois (43 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 135 (1999)), and North Dakota (N.D. Cent.
Code § 5-0-06.1(1987)). Of these, only North Dakota refused to recognize the
complicity doctrine as a bar to an action under the Dram Shop Act. See generally,
Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D. 1989) (refusing to apply the
complicity doctrine in a case of first impression). However, in a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Vande Walle cautioned against an overbroad interpretation of the
precedent, saying:
I would leave for another day the issue of whether or not complicity can
ever constitute a defense to a dram-shop action in North Dakota. Under
different circumstances we might be hard pressed to hold, as a matter of
law, that complicity can never constitute a defense. Indeed, public policy
might dictate a different result under different circumstances.
Id. at 162 (Vande Walle,J., concurring) (emphasis added).
122. Grady, 997 P.2d at 199. Oregon's Dramshop Act is also not as broad as
Minnesota's version. In Minnesota, any illegal act can trigger liability. Supra note
23 and accompanying text. In K.R v. Sanford, it was the after-hours, off-sale of the
vodka that brought the case under the Civil Damages Act. 605 N.W.2d 387, 389
(Minn. 2000).
123. Grady, 997 P.2d at 199.
19
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complete bar to recovery.1 4 They rightfully concluded that com-
plicity is distinguishable, on a primary basis, from contributory neg-
ligence. 25 It is a determination of who has standing to sue under
the statute. 126 In grouping the complicity doctrine together with
forms of negligence, the Minnesota Legislature had distorted the
essence of what is the doctrine, and forced it into a mold in which
it was not meant to fit.1
2 7
V. REPERCUSSIONS OF THE DECISION
A. Applied To K.R. v. Sanford
The case that creates this topic of discussion is an illustrative
example of the legislature's folly. First, however, it may be wise to
say a few words about causation.
As in any tort case, regardless of the statutorily created cause of
action, a plaintiff may not recover without showing that the deed
done by the defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
juries. Although at the time of this writing this case has not been
124. F.S. Tinio, Annotation, Third Person's Participating in or Encouraging Drink-
ing as Barring Him from Recovering Under Civil Damage or Similar Act, 26 A.L.R. 3d
1117 (1969).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1118 (citing Cookinham v. Sullivan, 179 A.2d 840 (Conn. 1962)
(reporting that "the issue was not whether plaintiff s acts contributed to his injury
in the sense of 'contributory negligence,' but whether he was of the group that the
statute was intended to protect.")
127. Although it has been described as a "defense," the doctrine was meant to
make clear who had standing to sue under the CDA. Martinson v. Monticello
Mun. Liquors, 297 Minn. 48, 54, 209 N.W.2d 902, 906 (1973). "[I]t is not the pur-
pose of the Civil Damages Act.. .to allow recovery to one who is himself a wrong-
doer and that, accordingly, such a wrongdoer does not fall within the class of those
to whom the statute gives a cause of action." Id.
128. To establish liability under the Dram Shop Act, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that the sale of alcohol was in violation of the statute; (2) that the violation was
substantially related to the purposes sought to be achieved by the Dram Shop Act;
(3) that the illegal sale was the cause of the intoxication, and (4) that the intoxica-
tion was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Kunza v. Pantze, 527 N.W.2d 846, 848
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 531 N.W.2d 839 (Minn. 1995). See
also Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275 (1965) (holding that
to establish liability under the CDA there had to "be a practical and substantial re-
lationship between the circumstances making the sale of liquor illegal and the cir-
cumstances accounting for the consumption of it by the one whose intoxication
caused damage."); Weber v. Au, 512 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that the claimant must show that the illegal sale of alcohol contrib-
uted to the intoxication of the individual and that the intoxication of the individ-
ual contributed to the cause of claimant's injuries)
1394 [Vol. 27:2
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tried before a jury, it seems that the plaintiff may have difficulties
proving that The Committee, as the bar owner, was the proximate
cause of her injuries.
Setting aside, for a minute, her illegal participation in the pro-
curement of the vodka, the plaintiff and her attackers (the other
defendants) (1) partied at a "rave," (2) snorted cocaine, and (3)
took a Ruffle. 12 Obviously, nothing the plaintiff said or did that
night should have caused, or should justify her falling victim to a
sexual attack. These facts are used only to illustrate that the vodka
drunk by the plaintiffs attackers played a comparatively small role
in her injuries. In light of the many factors involved in this case,
The Committee's culpability, as compared with its fellow defen-
dants, the attackers, seems trivial, at best.
The Committee's actual role in K.R.'s injuries can be dissected
further. Minnesota's dram shop act is at issue in this case because
the vodka drunk by KR. and her attackers had been illegally pro-
cured. 13' The vodka was purchased after hours and from an estab-
lishment without a license to sell liquor to be consumed off the
premises.1
3 1
The Committee sold the liquor. However, KR. was both an
employee involved in the illegal sale, and the purchaser of the
vodka. As a bartender at the club, she would well have been aware
of the illegality of her actions. A reasonable finder of fact may eas-
ily find her at least equally at fault as The Committee on this issue.
Under the CFA, the percentage of fault attributed to The
Committee, for their part in the illegal sale of the liquor, and the
injuries caused, will be compared with K.R.'s own fault on this is-
sue, added to any fault attributed to her for any other aspects of the132
case. To this, the other defendants' fault will also be com-
pared. 133 The CFA provides that a plaintiff will only recover if her
contributory fault is not greater than the fault of the person against
whom recovery is sought.'TM  Considering the small role the vodka
allegedly played in the attack, it is possible, maybe even probable,
that a reasonable finder of fact will find The Committee's fault less
than K.R.'s fault in this case.
129. Supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
130. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
131. Id.





Fisher: Torts—Complicity as a Comparative Fault in Minnesota: The Essence
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The above scenario is merely speculation based on known facts
of the case at hand. However, it serves to illustrate the precarious
position of the plaintiff. Having been granted standing to sue un-
der the CDA, instead of being barred because of her complicity,
the outcome will likely be the same. The clear message is that a
person in her position was simply not meant to benefit from a
Dram Shop Act, or else this type of situation should not have fallen
under the dram shop act in the first place. The extended journey
to reach this probable conclusion, however, has already eaten up
precious judicial recourses, and continues to do so.
B. Implications Generally
By expanding the class of persons protected by the statute, the
already overloaded court system will now be open to all ranges of
complicit individuals. Moreover, as illustrated by the present case,
many of these new plaintiffs will not recover anyway. In many of
these types of cases, a jury may likely find for the defendant when
comparing fault. The CDA was simply not intended to create a
cause of action for those who contributed to the intoxication which
harms them. In light of the consequences that will surely follow
this amendment, the legislature should revisit its decision.
C. Modest Proposal
The Minnesota legislature acted upon a recommendation in
enacting the 1990 amendment to the CDA. In time, the repercus-
sions will be felt both in the stretching ofjudicial recources and the
absurdity of future decisions. It is this author's hope that the legis-
lature remedies its mistake. The concerns that no doubt prompted
the legislature to act as it did can be dealt with in at least two other
ways.
First, the legislature should amend the CFA to delete the com-
plicity doctrine as fault to be compared. If indeed the legislature is
concerned about the situation in which one "buys a round" for an-
other, and in doing so bars himself from any recovery, any con-
cerns should be mollified by current case law which suggests that
this is not to be considered complicity."" However, if it is not, it
might be beneficial for the legislature to define complicity in the
State of Minnesota. No doubt there are situations that invite a
135. Supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff to be barred from recovery. There are just as likely situa-
tions in which a person, by virtue of his companionship, should not
be barred. "If [a] defendant is unable to present sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that [a] plaintiff's conduct actively contrib-
uted to or procured the inebriate's intoxication, the complicity de-
fense should not be submitted to the jury. The nonexistence of
complicity is forjudicial determination.' 3  This solution would al-
low the fundamental principles of the CDA to remain true by con-
tinuing to provide a remedy to innocent third persons. 13 It is not
the doctrine that is flawed; rather, the flaw lies in an imprecise
definition of what constitutes an active role in the intoxication.
138
A second suggestion is to amend the CDA to reflect a change
in what events will trigger liability under the statute. In Grady, li-
ability is triggered specifically by serving alcohol to a visibly intoxi-
cated person. 139 This is probably the scenario in mind when the
first legislatures enacted the dram shop acts. 14 It plays off of a neg-
ligence theory that, if one is already intoxicated, it is foreseeable
that providing him/her with more alcohol will cause injury. Like-
wise, knowingly selling alcohol to a minor might be asking for
trouble. Likely "complicit" individuals in these cases are other in-
toxicated persons and minors. Both of these are persons who
might not be in a position to make a self-preserving judgment, in
which case the vendor may be in a better position to make it for the
individual.
On the other hand, an establishment who illegally sells a sober
adult a closed container of alcohol without an off-sale license might
not be a legitimate defendant to a dram shop action. The same al-
cohol could likely have been purchased through legal means, and
if it had been, it would produce no viable cause of action. In any
case, the legislature should avoid creating a situation where plain-
tiffs sue liquor vendors simply because they can.
136. Walter v. Carriage House Hotels, Ltd., 646 N.E.2d 599, 606 (111. 1995).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 604. In this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois acknowledges a
similar problem and concluded that "the court's inconsistent application of the
complicity doctrine may have arisen from the lack of a clear analytical basis for the
complicity doctrine." Id.
139. Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
140. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D. 1989) (stating that the
objective of the legislature in enacting the Dramshop Act was to discourage bars
from selling intoxicating liquors to visibly intoxicated persons and minors and to
provide for recovery under certain circumstances by those that have been injured
as a result of the sale of intoxicating liquor).
2000] 1397
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VI. CONCLUSION
The court's job is to interpret legislation, not create it. Al-
though the court has repeatedly denied recovery to those who are
complicit, the legislature has spoken on this issue and the Minne-
sota Supreme Court must follow the legislature's lead. The legal
tragedy is that the legislature has chosen to overrule a sound legal
principle that had been in place in Minnesota for more than thirty
years. This new course of action will sacrifice judicial resources for
a mirage ofjustice.
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